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Introduction 
 
 
Seas of Trouble: Enduring Territorial 
Conflicts in East and Southeast Asia 
Felix Heiduk and Michael Paul 
In the last five years, tensions have increased between China and a number of neigh-
boring states over territorial disputes in the East and South China Sea. In some cases, 
there have even been threats of armed conflicts. China’s increasingly aggressive behav-
ior has stoked fears that long-simmering conflicts could escalate. This dismal picture 
began to brighten considerably, however, in the last half of 2014. In November, in the 
run-up to several important international summit meetings in the region, including 
the ASEAN Summit and the East Asia Summit (EAS), the parties to the conflicts began 
cautiously moving closer to one another and the security situation improved. Never-
theless, the drivers of the conflicts remain unchanged. They include conflicting terri-
torial claims, strategic misperceptions, and contested regional orders. 
 
The territorial conflicts in the East and 
South China Sea are symptomatic of both 
the changing power structures in the Asia 
Pacific and the widely differing conceptions 
of regional order of the United States and 
China, with no sign of convergence. The 
parties to the conflict therefore remain un-
sure as to how their perceived adversaries 
will behave in the future. The resulting stra-
tegic uncertainty will continue to shape 
developments in the region in the immedi-
ate future. 
China’s confrontational foreign policy in 
recent years has prompted its neighboring 
states to close ranks. In fact, the People’s 
Republic has achieved something an Ameri-
can government could never have done 
single-handedly: It has driven traditionally 
US-critical neighbors like Vietnam into 
Washington’s arms and facilitated a re-
newed, intensified partnership between 
the United States and the Philippines. 
In recent months, however, Chinese 
diplomacy has appeared less confronta-
tional, and Beijing has been taking a more 
conciliatory approach toward Japan, Viet-
nam, and the Philippines. For example, 
the Japanese Foreign Ministry registered 
an average of seven patrols per month by 
Chinese boats in Japanese-claimed waters 
between January and October 2014 com-
pared to an average of 16 patrols per month 
in 2013. And at the APEC Summit, a meeting 
took place between the Chinese and Japa-
nese heads of state, Xi and Abe, followed by 
official statements from China and Japan 
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on the island conflict. Here, for the first 
time, Japan conceded that there were 
fundamentally different positions in the 
conflict. Before this, Japanese government 
leaders had refused to even discuss the 
Chinese claims. Japan’s acknowledgment 
was widely seen as an important step 
towards an improvement in Sino-Japanese 
relations. 
Xi Jinping also met with Philippine Presi-
dent Benigno Aquino at the APEC Summit. 
Following their meeting, Aquino, too, com-
mented that there were signs of a “new 
beginning” in relations between the two 
countries. In the weeks preceding the APEC 
Summit, Vietnam and China had already 
begun moving closer after months-long 
conflict over the Paracel Islands in the South 
China Sea. The two countries agreed, among 
other things, to create a hotline to avoid 
incidents at sea. Beijing had previously 
removed a drilling platform from waters 
claimed by Vietnam. 
Unresolved territorial conflicts 
Despite the current easing of tensions, 
territorial disputes in the East and South 
China Sea remain unresolved. China’s 
diplomatic relations with its neighbors 
are pervaded by maritime conflicts over 
islands, coral reefs, and entire sea areas. 
In recent years, China’s growing power 
and its increasingly confrontational behav-
ior in Asia have fueled mistrust and raised 
suspicions that the People’s Republic is 
pursuing anything but a “peaceful rise.” 
Since 2009, China has made frequent 
threatening military gestures; Chinese 
ships have attacked fishing boats and other 
vessels, and what is more, China did not 
stop short of unilaterally asserting control 
of disputed territories. All of this is in stark 
contrast to China’s “charm offensive” in 
the early 2000s, when the country tried to 
present itself as a reliable and promising 
trade partner. In the meantime, however, 
China’s image in East Asia has deteriorated, 
and the country is now considered by many 
a potential threat to regional stability. 
China’s most notorious territorial dis-
pute is over five islands in the East China 
Sea around 200 kilometers northeast of 
Taiwan, 400 kilometers west of Okinawa, 
and 300 kilometers east of the Chinese 
mainland. The Sino-Japanese dispute over 
the islands referred to in Japan as “Sen-
kaku” and in China as “Diaoyu” does not 
just revolve around the wealth of fish and 
natural resources (oil and gas) in these 
waters. It extends, first, to broader disputes 
over territorial claims between China and 
Japan and the potential course of the border 
running between the two countries. Second, 
the island group is of immense geostrategic 
importance. And third, the islands are sym-
bols of national pride and defiance. Hence 
the question which of the two sides will 
keep them and which will give them up has 
major domestic political ramifications. 
Furthermore, if China were to succeed in 
taking possession of the islands, this would 
also signify a severe loss of power for the 
United States as Japan’s main ally, and 
would cause lasting damage to Japanese 
trust in the Japan-US security alliance. The 
island dispute is therefore part of a larger 
power struggle between China and the 
United States. 
On November 23, 2013, Beijing estab-
lished an Air Defense Identification Zone 
(ADIZ) in the East China Sea. In so doing, 
China was underscoring its claim not only 
to the Senkaku Islands but also to the sur-
rounding area, which overlaps with terri-
torial claims already established by South 
Korea and Taiwan. Chinese Defense Minis-
ter General Chang Wanquan declared in 
April 2014 that China has “indisputable 
sovereignty” over the islands and that it 
would make “no compromise, no conces-
sion, no treaty” on the issue. At the same 
time Barack Obama, during an official visit 
to Japan in April 2014, became the first US 
President to publicly confirm that US alli-
ance commitments to Japan extend to the 
protection of the disputed islands under 
Article 5 of the bilateral security treaty. 
In addition to the island conflict be-
tween Japan and China, there are also other 
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ongoing territorial conflicts in the South 
China Sea. China has laid claim to large 
parts of the South China Sea in an area 
delineated by the so-called “ten-dash line” 
on the basis of Chinese historic maps and 
documents. Yet the coral reefs and atolls 
in this area are claimed not only by China 
but also either in part or in whole by the 
Philippines, Malaysia, Taiwan, Brunei, and 
Vietnam. This again brings in the United 
States, which has declared a national in-
terest in ensuring the freedom of naviga-
tion in this area. From the US government’s 
point of view, Beijing’s vast territorial claims 
are unsustainable under international law, 
and its ten-dash line is therefore illegiti-
mate. Moreover, because of its treaty obli-
gations to the Philippines, the United States 
could also be involved in the case of a mili-
tary conflict in the South China Sea. 
The Philippines and Vietnam in particu-
lar have become embroiled in acute terri-
torial conflicts with China. The recent 
dispute between Beijing and Manila was 
triggered when a Philippine navy ship 
seized Chinese fishing vessels in an area 
around the Scarborough Shoal, which is 
part of the Spratly Islands. The Filipino 
inspectors claimed the Chinese boats were 
carrying endangered maritime species col-
lected within the Philippines’ 200 nautical 
mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ). 
The United States brokered a settlement 
between the two sides in June 2012. But 
only the Philippine ships withdrew as 
agreed, and since then, Chinese ships have 
maintained de facto control over the area. 
Manila responded by submitting a case 
against China before the International 
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS). 
The current disputes between China and 
Vietnam revolve around the Paracel Islands, 
which have been controlled by China since 
1974. When Hanoi passed a law in 2012 
demarcating Vietnamese sea borders to 
include the group of islands, Beijing re-
sponded by creating a prefecture (Sansha) 
to administer the Paracel and Spratly 
Islands. In May 2014, China moved a drill-
ing platform into waters off the coast of 
Vietnam south of the Paracel Islands. While 
Beijing considers this area to be part of 
Chinese territory, Vietnam sees it as part of 
its own EEZ. It was unambiguous, however, 
that China located the drilling platform in 
disputed waters and that this was intended 
as a provocation. Tensions increased when—
according to Vietnamese accounts—Chinese 
ships surrounded, rammed, and sank a Viet-
namese fishing boat near the islands. Bei-
jing, however, responded that the boat 
had forcefully intruded into its territory, 
rammed a Chinese ship, and then capsized. 
Thereafter, the drilling platform was re-
moved and diplomatic relations between 
Hanoi and Beijing were stepped up marked-
ly. Notwithstanding this, China announced 
in October 2104 that it had constructed an 
airstrip on Woody Island, one of the con-
tested Paracel Islands. At the same time, the 
Chinese launched land reclamation activi-
ties on the Johnson South Reef, which is 
also claimed by Vietnam. In other Vietnam-
ese-claimed waters (e.g., the Vanguard Bank), 
Chinese research vessels have continued 
their maritime research activities escorted 
by navy warships. 
Furthermore, while Japan, Vietnam, and 
the Philippines have been the main parties 
to territorial disputes with China up to now, 
it is feared that Indonesia may soon be 
drawn into the territorial disputes as well. 
Jakarta has always emphasized its role as 
a “non-claimant state” and has called 
repeatedly for a peaceful resolution to the 
conflicts. Simultaneously, the Indonesian 
government has officially protested Chinese 
claims to sea areas that are part of Indo-
nesia’s exclusive economic zone around the 
Natuna Islands. Yet Indonesia has consist-
ently refrained from referring to this as a 
“territorial dispute” with China. From the 
Indonesian point of view, doing so would 
have lent a certain validity to the Chinese 
claims. In addition, Jakarta has gone to 
great lengths to avoid calling its strategic 
partnership with China, which was forged 
in 2005, into question. Yet the increasingly 
frequent intrusions of Chinese vessels into 
waters surrounding the Natuna Islands are 
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a source of concern for Indonesia. The 
Indonesian military therefore announced 
plans in February 2014 to strengthen its 
presence in the Natuna Islands by deploy-
ing a squadron of Sukhoi fighter aircraft 
and four Apache attack helicopters to its 
military base there. This does not signify 
an about-face in Sino-Indonesian relations, 
but it has nonetheless stoked fears that 
Indonesia could lose its role as an “honest 
broker” in the conflicts over who controls 
the South China Sea. 
(Mis-)Perceptions and 
strategic uncertainties  
Beijing’s more assertive foreign policy 
approach has broad support within the 
Chinese population. The majority of the 
public and the ruling elites share the view 
that the country is not making sufficient 
use of its military strength to pursue its 
foreign policy objectives. What is viewed 
elsewhere as aggressive expansion is seen 
in China as the consolidation of justified 
claims to power. China has repeatedly 
pointed out that it is far behind other 
countries in asserting its territorial claims 
and in developing underwater oil and gas 
reserves. If it wants to avoid losing the 
race for hegemony in the South China Sea, 
China will have to assert its claims quickly 
and effectively. In this context, the “Asia 
pivot” of the United States and increased 
US ties to countries like the Philippines 
and Vietnam are interpreted by Beijing as 
attempts to “contain” China. China sees 
itself as the “victim” of such containment 
efforts and as being pushed to adopt a 
defensive stance in its foreign policy, even 
towards significantly smaller neighbors like 
Vietnam and the Philippines. Xi Jinping’s 
keynote foreign policy address in late 
November left little doubt that the Chinese 
leadership considers its “more aggressive” 
foreign policy of recent years to have been 
a success. A strategic change of course in 
the near future is therefore unlikely. 
The largely positive domestic view of 
China’s more self-confident role on the 
world stage stands increasingly at odds 
with the country’s negative image in the 
region: Japanese, Filipino, and Vietnamese 
respondents to a 2014 survey cited China as 
the greatest threat to their respective coun-
tries. In response to the question of whether 
China’s disputes with its neighbors could 
escalate into military conflicts, 93 percent 
of respondents in the Philippines, 85 per-
cent in Japan, 84 percent in Vietnam, 83 
percent in South Korea, and in another sur-
vey, more than half of respondents in China 
(53.4 percent) answered “yes”. 
From a Vietnamese perspective, the lack 
of “regional trust” in China results mainly 
from the threat Beijing’s expansionist policy 
poses to regional security and stability. In 
the view of Vietnamese Chief of Staff Gener-
al Do Ba Ty, nothing has changed in China’s 
general strategy of asserting its territorial 
claims through unilateral action, whether 
by occupying islands and reefs or by creat-
ing artificial islands. Coming from there, 
China’s more subdued rhetoric has not 
been accompanied by any observable change 
in the country’s behavior. 
The view from the Philippines is similar 
to that from Vietnam. Political decision-
makers and the media have repeatedly 
described China’s foreign policy as a “creep-
ing invasion.” The President of the Philip-
pines, Benigno Aquino III, has often com-
pared Chinese claims to hegemony over 
the South China Sea with Nazi Germany’s 
claim to the Sudetenland. The Philippines 
see themselves as confronted with a mili-
tarily and economically superior power 
that seems to be working to gradually 
expand into Philippine territory. Aquino 
described the current situation by saying: 
“At what point do you say ‘Enough is 
enough’? Well the world has to say it—re-
member that the Sudetenland was given 
in an attempt to appease Hitler to prevent 
World War II.” 
Japanese Premier Minister Shinzo Abe 
compared the significance of the Senkaku/ 
Diaoyu Islands to that of the Falklands, 
saying that, like the British under Margaret 
Thatcher in 1982, he would be willing to go 
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to war for them. Some observers have 
painted an even bleaker picture of the Sino-
Japanese island conflict in the East China 
Sea, likening the situation to 1914, when 
the world stood at the brink of World War I. 
Even if these historical analogies may not 
entirely fit the case at hand, the statements 
and inherent views reveal a deep mistrust 
toward Beijing. In addition, all the parties 
to the conflict have intensified their nation-
alist rhetoric—mainly in order to appear 
defiant to their constituencies at home. How-
ever, the instrumentalization of nationalist 
discourses to gain political legitimacy is 
also putting governments in Beijing, Hanoi, 
and Manila under increasing pressure to 
project strength in foreign policy as well. 
Geopolitical rivalries and 
contending regional orders  
The territorial conflicts between China and 
its neighboring states are part of a broader 
geopolitical struggle between China and 
the United States for power and influence 
in the Asia-Pacific. For Washington, this 
geopolitical space has played an important 
role in its efforts since the end of World 
War II to ensure the prevalence of a US-
led regional order as well as to maintain 
America’s role as a global superpower. 
For China’s ruling party, control over its 
maritime periphery is critical for survival, 
especially economically. Since China’s 
integration into the global economy, mari-
time transport routes have taken on critical 
importance, and safeguarding these water-
ways has become a political imperative. 
They have become an “integral component 
of China’s national interest” as laid out in 
a defense ministry statement in Beijing in 
2013. Given China’s reliance on these sea 
routes, a peaceful and stable maritime 
situation has become decisive for the coun-
try’s development. Critical Sea Lines of 
Communication (SLOCs) like those that run 
through the Straits of Malacca ensure trade 
and the supply of oil, gas, and natural re-
sources as well as food and consumer goods. 
They not only allow the government in 
Beijing to pacify the population with eco-
nomic growth and a stable supply of goods 
but more importantly provide legitimacy 
for the continuing one-party rule of the 
Communist Party. The protection of mari-
time trade routes and the stability of the 
Chinese regime thus represent two sides of 
the same coin. 
In addition to protecting maritime sup-
ply lines, Beijing is therefore also attempt-
ing to restrict the decades-long operational 
freedom of the US Navy on China’s mari-
time periphery. According to a Pentagon 
report, China now has not only the largest 
fleet of warships, submarines, and amphibi-
ous warfare ships in Asia but also long-
range anti-ship ballistic missiles. With these 
capabilities, Beijing can now either prevent 
other states from gaining access to regions, 
at least in specific geographic areas and for 
limited periods of time (anti-access, A2) or re-
strict other states’ free operations in a region 
(area denial, AD). Chinese A2/AD capabilities 
in the East and South China Sea have the po-
tential to limit the US ability to project pow-
er in China’s maritime periphery. Because 
of this, they are viewed as an instrument to 
counter the perceived containment of China 
by the US and its allies and to undermine 
American leadership in the region. 
But China is not only working to expand 
its military strength; it is also striving to 
steadily increase its political influence in 
the region. Xi Jinping is generally working 
to identify “Asian solutions to Asian prob-
lems” under China’s leadership and to 
thereby limit the influence of outside 
powers (especially the United States). Xi’s 
“new model” for bilateral relations between 
the two major powers, the United States 
and China, envisions a comprehensive 
power shift within Asia to Beijing. In line 
with this model, the vision of a Sino-centric 
regional order is reflected in a number of 
recent Chinese initiatives and activities: the 
newly founded Asian Investment and Infra-
structure Bank (AIIB); Beijing’s support for 
a free trade agreement (Regional Compre-
hensive Economic Partnership, RCEP) that 
the ASEAN countries are negotiating with 
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countries including Australia, China, India, 
and Japan but excluding the United States; 
China’s prominent role in the Chiang-Mai 
Initiative (CMI), a multilateral currency swap 
arrangement; Beijing’s efforts to forge closer 
economic ties with China’s western neigh-
bors by establishing a Eurasian as well as a 
maritime economic belt (“Silk Road”); and 
the Xiangshan Forum, a bi-annual exchange 
on security and defense policy which could 
serve as the Chinese counterpart to the 
Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore. 
As America’s first “Pacific president,” 
Obama has reacted with a strategy of “Asia-
Pacific Rebalance.” The aim is to reassure 
the states in the region—particularly US 
allies that are nervous about China’s grow-
ing strength—that they can continue to rely 
on the United States as the guarantor of the 
status quo in the Pacific. The United States’ 
intention to restore US power in the region 
has political, economic, and military dimen-
sions. A key aim is to strengthen existing 
alliances and to expand partnerships. How-
ever, in supporting its allies and partners 
in Asia, Washington will have to balance 
between providing necessary protection 
and assistance and encouraging a measure 
of caution and restraint. On the one hand, 
the US needs to urge its allies in the region 
to undertake their own efforts in resisting 
Chinese ambitions, backed with the assur-
ance of US protection. But the US also needs 
to discourage its allies from aggressive be-
havior toward China, for instance in mari-
time territorial disputes that could entangle 
the United States in a military confronta-
tion against its will. Obama recently sum-
marized the general view of the United 
States at the close of the G20 Summit in 
Brisbane. According to the US President, 
Asia is currently facing a stark choice 
between two competing models for the 
region’s future political order: on the one 
hand a (US-dominated) model that envisions 
more integration, more justice, and more 
peace; and on the other hand a (Chinese) 
model dominated by disorder and conflict. 
In addition, economy and trade are both 
the underlying causes as well as the instru-
ments of the US shift in strategic focus. Not 
only is Asia of paramount importance to 
the global economy in general; it has also 
gained particular relevance in the context 
of President Obama’s national export initia-
tive. Growing American economic interests 
in Asia and the growth in import and export 
trade, mostly in goods transported by sea, 
make the West Pacific an area of immense 
geo-economic significance. The United States 
must therefore have an interest not only in 
freedom of navigation in this area but also 
in a stable economic order—both of which 
require safeguarding. Already during the 
Clinton administration, efforts were made 
to support Asia-Pacific Economic Coopera-
tion (APEC) as a regional forum, and Clin-
ton’s successor, George W. Bush, launched 
negotiations over a Trans-Pacific Partner-
ship (TPP) with various states in the region, 
but excluding China. In Washington’s view, 
the TPP offers a chance to consolidate US 
economic interests and define the rules of 
the world economy for years to come. It 
therefore essentially represents the trade 
policy dimension of the US “Asia pivot.” 
From an American standpoint, the TPP 
would also reinforce US security policy and 
promote American exports. Washington’s 
plans to advance an American vision of 
economic policy in the form of the TPP at 
this year’s APEC summit suffered a severe 
setback, however, when the Free Trade Area 
of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP) was included on 
the summit agenda. Observers interpret 
its addition to the APEC agenda as a direct 
challenge to the TPP due to the fact that 
the FTAAP was conceived by Beijing years 
ago as the antithesis to the TPP. The FTAAP 
would include all APEC member states and 
thus almost half of the world’s population. 
A study launched at the APEC summit to 
examine various aspects of the FTAAP’s po-
tential realization is scheduled for presen-
tation in 2016. All of this illustrates the 
emergence of competing visions of regional 
order on the economic policy level as well, 
and they are likely to continue to exist 
despite the current easing of tensions.  
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Conclusion: Improved political 
climate, enduring conflicts 
China’s conciliatory gesture towards Japan 
at the APEC Summit in November 2014 and 
the Sino-American deal to reduce harmful 
emissions have improved the political cli-
mate, yet they have brought about no fun-
damental changes in Chinese foreign 
policy. There is still great uncertainty over 
whether China’s current more conciliatory 
diplomacy is part of a “cyclical” alternation 
between ambition and restraint, or whether 
Chinese leaders have recently embarked on 
a more cautious medium-term approach 
due to protests from neighboring states. 
These tactical questions aside, there is still 
no sign that China’s overall ambitions and 
objectives will be changing anytime in the 
near future. A report published in Jane’s 
Defense Weekly in November 2014 pro-
vided satellite imagery showing Chinese 
dredgers dumping sand on three kilome-
ters of reef in the Spratly Islands to create 
an artificial island. According to the report, 
the new landmass would be large enough 
to build an airstrip. An artificial harbor was 
also constructed. The report also mentions 
that China has reclaimed three further 
islands over recent months which could 
serve as a future base for Chinese fishing 
boats or the coast guard. 
China is working on various levels to 
expand its influence, while the United 
States is attempting to maintain the status 
quo. Despite widespread opposition to 
Chinese efforts, Washington’s ability able 
to prevail against Beijing has been under 
increasing doubt in the region due to the 
rising number of crises, conflicts, and wars 
in other parts of the world in recent times. 
And since the issues driving the conflicts 
in the Asia’s troubled waters continue to 
be unresolved, strategic uncertainty will 
remain a key factor in the foreign policy 
decisions of states in the region. 
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